Summary
providers. Currently, there are four identifiable categories of user fees in public facilities (Adams 1996) . "Cash-and-Carry" programme for drugs. This is essentially a revolving drug fund that was introduced nationwide in 1992. The fee per drug item charged to users is related to the procurement cost of the item, marked up with fixed percentages by central and regional medical stores. Other nationally authorized charges. These are the prices defined in the national fee schedule that was instituted in 1985. Locally authorized charges. These are fees established by individual health facilities. The practice is legal, but the fee levels are not grounded in national legislation. This approach has, in many places, rendered the official fee schedule non-operative, since locally authorized fees are adjusted regularly to keep pace with inflation. Illegal or unauthorized charges. These are the charges levied by individual providers in public facilities, including fees charged by health professionals for their services and by 'contractors' and 'frontmen' for a variety of services (e.g. disposal of placenta), and 'commissions' on sales of drugs and other consumables.
Government policies on fees also defined entitlements to full or partial exemption from payment. Persons qualifying for full exemption include "paupers", health workers, patients with tuberculosis and leprosy, psychiatric patients and some services including immunization. Antenatal and postnatal services and treatment at child welfare clinics are to be provided free of charge, except for hospital accommodation and catering charges. L.I. 1313 also provides for exemption from all charges except those for prescribed drugs for a wide range of (mostly) communicable diseases. The objectives of these regulations appear to have been to ensure financial access to care for poor people and persons with communicable diseases, encourage use of preventive services, and to provide a benefit to health workers. Despite these provisions, it is believed that many health facility managers are not interested in granting exemptions because of their growing dependence on user fee revenues to meet their non-salary expenses. In addition, low income persons may not be aware that they are entitled to an exemption, or if they are, they may be unwilling to declare themselves to be "paupers" because of the stigma attached to this.
Study objectives, setting and methods
As a result of concerns about the effects of user fees and because implementation of fees and exemptions is difficult to monitor through routine systems, the Ministry of Health, through the Volta Regional Health Administration, defined and undertook a study to provide evidence as a basis for reforming fee/exemption policies and practices.
Objectives of the study
Specific objectives were to: 1) describe prevailing charging and exemption practices in the Volta Region's health facilities 2) analyse the effects of these practices on facility financing and service utilization a. determine sources and levels of financing of the various institutions b.
determine the utilization patterns of each facility 3) assess community perceptions on prevailing charging practices and the health system 4) make recommendations for the revision of policies and practices with respect to user fees and exemptions
Study setting: the Volta Region
This study was conducted in the Volta Region--one of the 10 administrative regions in Ghana. The region has an estimated population of 1.8 million (based on the 1984 national population census), with an annual growth rate of 1.8%. Population density is 72 inhabitants per square kilometre. About 70% of the population live in rural areas, with agriculture being the main economic activity (Ghana Statistical Service 1995). Average living standards in Volta are very similar to those of Ghana as a whole (World Bank 1997b). i Methods and data sources A variety of methods and information sources was used for the study, involving both primary and secondary data. Facility-based data collected for this study involved all of the 11 hospitals (1 regional and 10 district) in the Region and 13 health centres, for a total of 24 sites. The following information was collected using questionnaires and checklists:
• actual charging practices, for both official and unofficial fees (using exit poll interviews with outpatients and inpatients, plus interviews with facility 'in-charges')
• financial data of health facilities (revenues and expenditures)
• service utilization data (patient registers) of health facilities • facility records on the number and category of persons exempted Twenty-three community-based Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also conducted as part of the study. The FGDs elicited opinions from community members (not necessarily recent users of health facilities) about the health system in general and user charges in particular.
Findings

Pricing practices
There are no legal regulation authorising institutions of fix fees on their own other than the stipulated fees prescribed in L.I. 1313. While it is known that facility managers are levying locally authorized charges to provide revenues to meet operating expenses, the MOH does not have information on the amounts actually being charged. Table 1 compares official fees with the amounts that users reported paying. Registration/consultation fees are used for this comparison because the amount paid by patients for this service reflects a pure price effect (i.e. for drugs or lab tests, the expenditure reflects the quantity of services in addition to the price, whereas there can only be one registration/consultation per outpatient contact). The average amount paid for consultation in Ho Regional Hospital, other government district hospitals and health centres reflected an increase of about 700% in nominal terms over the approved rates in L.I. 1313. Inflation in Ghana has been increasing at an average annual rate of about 30% since 1985. Adjusting the official fee levels by the CPI each year to the first quarter of 1996 yields an estimate of the value of the 1985 fee levels at the time the patient interviews were conducted. A comparison of the inflation-adjusted fees for registration/consultation with reported expenditures on this service (shown in Table 1 ) reveals that in real terms, patients were paying about half in 1996 for this service than they were in 1985. This does not mean, however, that consumers are spending less in health facilities now than they were after official fees were introduced, because we do not know if fees other than registration/consultation have in fact risen faster than the rate of inflation.
L.I.1313 states that input costs should be used as the basis for setting drug fees, and the government has defined standard mark-ups for drugs to operationalise this policy. Central medical stores (CMS) sets a 37.5% mark-up for locally produced drugs and 57.55% for imported drugs under the Cash-and-Carry system. Individual facilities have a 5% mark-up over this. Because of confusion about the levels of mark-ups, and in order to streamline the system, the Regional Medical Stores (RMS) of the Volta Regional Health Administration set the levels of mark-ups for the RMS and the facilities as follows:
The RMS Unit Price has a 20% mark-up on the procurement price from the CMS. The facility price is set with a 13% mark-up on the procurement price from the RMS, rounded to the nearest whole number.
Thus, the total mark-up on the procurement price from CMS to patients of Volta Region health facilities should be 33%. A rapid assessment of the Cash-and-Carry system in the Volta Region (VRHA 1996) showed that in practice, however, the fee per drug item charged to users varies by district and by level of operation. Drug fees ii The amounts that facility in-charges reported as their registration/consultation fees were similarly high (¢500 at the regional hospital and a median of ¢400 for the other government facilities).
are related to the procurement cost of the item, but mark-ups are not standard. As a result, patients are paying drug fees in the range of 11% to 275% over the facility approved prices.
Fee collection practices
The study revealed several aspects of collection practices with consequences for the efficiency, equity, and acceptability of user fees. These aspects include the number of points within a facility at which fees are collected, the extent to which deposits are required for hospitalisation, the issuing of receipts for amounts paid, and the provision of clear information on price levels at fee collection points. Each of these is discussed in turn below.
Payment points
Currently charges are levied for registration/consultation, drugs, laboratory services and other procedures. Payments for these services are made at the point of service provision. Thus, clients make several payments in the course of a single visit. This is time consuming and an added burden to the tasks of nurses (especially in the case of inpatients) who spend a considerable amount of time ensuring fee collection, which diverts them from their main patient care responsibilities. This practice is also likely to be subjected to abuse (i.e. a demand for under-the-table payments) since the introduction of fees for health has more or less conferred a certain legitimacy on charging patients, especially in the face of loosened controls on local practices.
Deposit system
Due to the high cost of services and the enthusiasm of facility heads to recover these costs, it is common practice for facility heads to insist on the payment of deposits (advance payment in partial fulfilment of the projected total cost of treatment) for inpatient services, especially in mission hospitals. While it is fair to say that deposits help to promote cost recovery, they pose a serious threat to accessibility and the management of patients in the absence of clear-cut guidelines regarding service provision for emergencies and "paupers", and of public information on the level of deposit that is required.
Receipting
One way of promoting transparency in the cost recovery system and to limit 'leakage' in fee collection is to keep accurate records of amounts charged. Receipts are supposed to be issued for both nationally authorized and locally authorized charges, as well as for drugs under the Cash-and-Carry system. This is, currently, the only proof that fees have been collected. With a national adult literacy rate of 49%, however, many clients are not in a position to verify if the receipts issued to them tally with the amounts paid. Table 2 shows (a) the number and percentage of outpatients who were given receipts for all, some or none of the payments that they made, and (b) the extent to which the receipts corresponded to the amounts that the respondents reported paying. This table shows that nearly 60% of the outpatients interviewed were given receipts on all monies paid, but many of those who received receipts for some or all of the services for which they paid were not given accurate receipts. All situations other than that of the 128 persons (just over half of the respondents) who were given receipts on all monies paid and whose receipts tallied with the total reported as paid represent a lack of transparency and a potential loss of money (totally or partially) to the health system. In all, 60% of the respondents received receipts that tallied with the amounts that they paid and 40% did not. While there are a few specific categories of charges for which receipts are not normally issued (e.g. processing of police forms), it is likely that some of this 'under-receipting' reflects under-the-table payments requested of patients.
Although the outpatient exit poll shows that non-receipting occurred frequently, this practice was not distributed evenly across all services. In government hospitals, only 39% of those who paid registration fees and 41% of those who paid for laboratory services were given receipts as against 93% of those who paid for drugs. The same trend was observed in health centres, i.e. 28%, 47% and 92% respectively. This suggests, perhaps, that the management system in place for Cash-and-Carry drugs should be extended to other fees as well.
Advertisement of fee schedules at fee collection points
One way of clearing doubt and avoiding suspicion with respect to fee collection is through advertisement of fees within the premises of the facility, preferably at the point of fee collection. Regrettably, none of the facilities sampled had advertised fees. Indeed, virtually all of the focus group participants said that they had no idea whatsoever about the level of fees chargeable for services received in health facilities, implying that there is a great deal of uncertainty about what a visit to a health facility is likely to cost. This uncertainty is itself a 'cost' that may act as a barrier to utilization.
Exemption practices
While government regulations clearly indicate the categories of patients that qualify for exemption, five (22%) of the 23 in-charges interviewed said that no group of patients is exempted in their facilities. Interestingly, all hospital in-charges said that they do have exemptions, so it was only health centre in-charges (five of thirteen, 38%) that said they have no exemptions. While most said that they do grant exemptions, the official exemption categories are not well understood. Only one in-charge said that they gave exemptions for 'paupers/disabled', eight and two said that they gave exemptions for tuberculosis and leprosy, respectively.
The total number of exemptions in 1995 in the Volta Region (1,895) was less than one percent of total number of recorded patient contacts. Based on data collected from 24 health facilities on the number and type of exemptions granted in 1995, the most common reason for exemption (71% of the total exemptions recorded) was for health staff. However, three mission hospitals accounted for 95% of these health worker exemptions, so this cannot be said to reflect the usual practice of health facilities in the region. Twelve of the 24 facilities recorded exemptions for paupers, but of these, only two recorded more than 20 patients exempted for this reason for all of 1995. Seven of the facilities recorded no exemptions, and another nine recorded 20 or fewer total exemptions for the year. In Ho Regional Hospital, only two out of a total client load of 41,881 were identified as paupers. In 12 health centres, only 224 exemptions were granted in 1995, compared to a total of 62,755 OPD visits. These findings appear to confirm the suspicion that the official exemption rules are functioning very poorly and are clearly not meeting the objectives of the policy. Evidence from the outpatient exit poll interviews confirms that the exemptions for the low income persons are almost completely non-functional. Of the 313 outpatients selected at random, only five (1.6%) did not pay anything for their care, and one of these five was a TB patient. Thus, even if the other four were indeed exempted on grounds of poverty, this remains a tiny proportion of the overall patient population, far below any reasonable estimate of the extent of poverty in the population. According to a World Bank study (1995), the percentage of Ghana's total population living in poverty in 1992 was either about 31% or 15%, depending on the definition of the poverty line. The implications of the findings on the extent of exemptions granted are either that (1) poor people are paying a substantial amount of their incomes on health care when they become sick, or (2) poor people are not seeking care at health facilities when they become sick. In all likelihood, both are true, to varying degrees. In any event, the evidence indicates that, in practice, the statutory exemption for low income persons protects neither their access to care nor their incomes.
Analysis of the small number of outpatients and inpatients interviewed who indicated they received a diagnosis from their provider allows for some assessment of the functioning of the full and partial exemptions for persons with particular diseases and conditions. Table 3 summarizes the fee payment experience of persons whose conditions entitled them to either full or partial exemption.
Implications of user fees for facility financing
In 1995, the distribution of recurrent revenue sources for 15 facilities in the Volta Region for which complete data are available is shown in Table 4 . As shown in the table, user fee revenue (referred to in Ghana's accounting system as Internally Generated Funds, or IGFs) accounted for about two-thirds of health centre nonsalary revenues and more than 80% of hospital non-salary revenues in public sector facilities in the Volta Region during the period under review. Most fee income is generated by the Cash-and-Carry drug fund. In 1995, drug fees represented about 78% of health centre IGFs and just over 50% of public hospital revenue (mission hospital records did not allow for a consistent measure of this). Donations in cash or kind were generally insignificant within the public sector during the period under review.
The most striking feature of health financing in the Volta Region that is revealed by this table is the significant role of user fee revenue in facility financing, especially as a source of funds for non-salary operating costs. Clearly, both government and mission health facilities depend on user fees in order to sustain service delivery. This has become increasingly true in recent years. Budget allocations for non-salary operating expenses (referred to as Financial Encumbrances, or FEs) dropped by 60% in real terms between 1992 and 95, a period when overall government allocations for non-staff expenditures was rising. Thus, the important role of user fees as a source of funds reflects, in part, the consequences of government's withdrawal of financial support for the health sector, especially for non-staff inputs. Data on expenditures by health facilities (Table 5 ) confirm the important contribution that user fee revenues make to the financial sustainability of service provision. As might be expected, IGFs were used primarily to purchase drugs as part of the Cash-and-Carry system. Based on 1995 data from facilities with complete information, drug purchases accounted for about 79% of IGF expenditures by health centres and 52% of IGF expenditures by the public hospitals. The records of mission hospitals do not allow for a comparable calculation, but the likelihood is that they spend less on drugs as a percentage of their total IGF expenditures because of their greater need to purchase other inputs (given the near-absence of any FEs to these facilities). 
Utilization trends and patterns
Utilization data were collected from the 25 largest facilities in the region, including the 11 hospitals (six public and five mission). Table 6 shows the annual number of total and per capita visits to these facilities from 1989 to 1996. No figures are presented for 1991 and 1992 because of missing data. The table indicates that total utilization during the period 1993-96 is higher than in previous years, but only in 1993 was population coverage as high as it was in 1989. While the figures understate total utilization rates for the region somewhat (because only 14 health centres are included), absolute levels of facility utilization are low, consistent with the pattern generally found throughout Ghana. Note: Visits per 1,000 population are calculated based on a regional population figure of 1.8 million in 1996 and an average annual growth rate of 1.8% for the entire period.
The data reveal interesting changes in the pattern of utilization. In particular, by decomposing utilization among the three different types of facilities (i.e. mission hospitals, government hospitals and health centres) it becomes apparent that the higher absolute levels of utilization in the 1993-96 period were a consequence of growth in the use of health centres. For these 25 facilities, the share of health centres in total OPD utilization rose from 19 percent in 1989 to 33 percent in 1996. During this period, the level of utilization in mission hospitals held roughly constant. Use of government hospitals fell substantially in 1990 and fluctuated at a higher level between 1993 and 1996, though never reaching as high as the 1989 level.
Discussion
Fees and exemptions in the broader framework of health care financing To make an appropriate interpretation of the above findings, it is necessary to place the role of user fees within the broader context of health service financing at the regional level in Ghana. Service providers include, in the public sector, the Ho Regional Hospital, district hospitals, subdistrict health centres, and the public health services provided directly by each district health administration. Private sector providers include mission hospitals, private clinics and individual allopathic practitioners, traditional practitioners, and pharmacies/drug sellers. Table 7 summarizes these flows and for each identifies the institutional level of the health system that is responsible for making decisions over the allocation of resources. While many things could be derived from this table, a critical issue that the table highlights is that resources in the system are not fully fungible. The source of funds and the purpose for which the funds are to be used matters, from a managerial perspective. This has several key implications that are relevant for understanding some of the reasons for the above-reported findings on fee and exemption practices:
There is no legal source of payments to government health workers other than the MOH salary budget. Public sector hospital managers can control the use of both their non-salary budget allocations (FEs) and their drug and non-drug legal user fee revenues, but they can not directly control the magnitude of their FE budget. While the DDHS is responsible for allocating the FE budget of health centres, the in-charges of these facilities have the primary authority to allocate user fee revenues. For facility managers, therefore, user fee revenues are more attractive than FE revenues because (1) managers have greater control over user fees, and (2) as shown above, the magnitude of user fee revenues is far greater. For health workers in the government service, illegal 'under-the-counter' payments are the only option available for supplementing their incomes. This combination of circumstances has raised concerns that mobilizing fee revenues has become so important to managers and providers that they are not adequately pursuing other objectives, especially equity. The findings of this study suggest that these concerns are justified.
Fees and utilization: price and quality effects
Studies from Ghana (Lavy and Germain 1995) and elsewhere (Litvack and Bodart 1993) suggest that the negative utilization effects of user fees can be mitigated (or even turned into positive gains) if the fee revenues are used effectively to purchase perceptible improvements in the quality of care, most typically by increasing the availability of drugs in health facilities. The extent to which the price effect can be mitigated by the quality effect depends, therefore, on the ability of facility managers to use these resources to improve quality and the responsiveness of the population to these quality improvements.
An earlier analysis of user fees in the Volta Region (Waddington and Enyimayew 1990) found that many managers were reluctant to spend these funds (half of the facilities studied had not spent anything from this source) because they believed the mechanisms for doing so were too complicated. Evidence from 1995 suggests that this is no longer a problem, both for IGFs and FE funds over which in-charges have considerable autonomy. Table 7 shows that, in general, the rate at which these revenues were spent was high in 1995. Thus, one might conclude that the willingness, and probably the ability, of managers to make spending decisions has improved considerably during the 1990s. Unlike Waddington and Enyimayew's (1990) previous study of the effects of user fees in the Volta Region, we cannot make a clear link between utilization patterns and trends in the 1989-96 period and changes in user fee policy. The reason is, simply, that there was no discrete point in time at which a policy change was introduced and implemented. Several things did occur, however, which might serve as possible explanations of some of the changes in utilization that were observed. These include:
• introduction of Cash-and-Carry on a pilot basis in the region during the second and third quarters of 1990 and nationally during 1992; • Hospital Management Training Initiative, beginning in late 1992;
• increase in the availability of drugs in health facilities. The introduction of Cash-and-Carry probably had a mixed effect on service use. Utilization may have been reduced as charges for drugs increased and became more widespread. This effect should have been minimal since L.I.1313 already indicated that drugs should be sold 'at cost'. However, the Cash-and-Carry system allowed for explicit mark-ups which may have raised prices somewhat more. On the positive side, the availability of drugs has increased. Before the introduction of Cash-and-Carry, most government facilities did not have drugs on a regular basis, and patients were often given prescriptions to go and buy their drugs on the open market. In combination with the Hospital Management Training Initiative, which emphasized quality of care issues, Cash-and-Carry contributed to an improvement in drug availability in government hospitals, from 22% in 1987 to 85% at the end of 1996. In health centres, drug availability was up to 90% in 1996 (VRHA 1996) . The contribution that user fee revenues have made to improved drug availability at health facilities has undoubtedly mitigated the negative utilization effects of the fees themselves, at least in terms of average levels of per capita utilization since 1990. This may have encouraged some 'near-poor' persons to seek care in health facilities that they otherwise might not have sought. Available drugs in public and mission facilities also act as a check upon rises in the price of drugs sold by private chemists. Without more detailed information, however, it is not possible to say how far down the income scale of the population these benefits have reached. We may theorize that upper and middle income persons are better off because they have access to care that they perceive to be of good quality as a result of the fee system, and that the poor are all but excluded from using health facilities by formal and informal charges. However, the data are insufficient to estimate just how large the 'middle income' population segment is. Despite this, it seems reasonable to conclude that if prices have not been increasing in real terms while the availability of drugs has improved, then there may have been some improvements in the 'relative equity' of the system. This positive conclusion is of little benefit to those living in poverty (perhaps 15 to 30 percent of the population), for whom the absolute level of prices is probably sufficient to exclude them from the formal health care system.
An unintended 'quality improvement' effect
The importance of drugs for both attracting patients and generating income for health facilities may be having an unintended effect. As part of this user fee study, an investigation was made into prescribing practices in Volta Region's health facilities. On average, 4.3 drugs are included on each prescription. This is considered to be too high, especially when many prescriptions are for malaria, and the appropriate treatment for this would be two items--an anti-malarial and an analgesic. Indeed, the study found that when malaria alone was the diagnosis, most (86%) of the prescriptions contained between 3 and 5 drugs.
The figure of 4.3 drugs per prescription is identical to that found in a study in 1992 shortly after Cash-and-Carry was introduced, and only slightly lower than a figure of 4.5 in a study that took place prior to the introduction of Cash-and-Carry in Volta. While this suggests that the user fee system in Ghana has not increased excess prescribing practices, it has also not mitigated them.
Fees and the efficiency of facility utilization patterns
Since fee levels are determined by individual facilities, there many be no differential between health centre and hospital charges for the same service, giving the patient no financial incentive to use the health centre as the point of first contact. Indeed, given the dependence of all facilities on user fee income, hospitals have a strong incentive to compete for primary care patients, and they are in a strong position to do to, given the difference in human resources (i.e. the presence of doctors at hospitals) between the facilities. The rising share of health centres in total OPD utilization, however, suggests that these potential efficiency problems have not been realized, and addressing the fee structure across types of facilities may not be a priority concern at this time.
Fees and community perceptions of the health system
The variety of information collected as part of this study, in addition to other sources of information, point to a disturbing situation in Volta that may be representative of Ghana as a whole. This can be summarized in the following, admittedly over-simplified manner. The way that user fees are being implemented has exacerbated the differences between users and non-users of health facilities. The dividing line between the two groups is largely economic. Those who use services are those who can afford them, including their ability to accommodate uncertainty in knowing how much a visit or hospitalisation will cost. This part of the population is reaping the benefits of increased drug availability in the health facilities and tends to view the system favourably. The rest of the population is largely outside the formal health system. They are very resentful of the way fees have been implemented, in part because of the high prices charged, but more because they believe that increased prices have not been accompanied by improvements in service quality and staff behaviour. Their view of health workers can be described as 'them vs. us'. They view the health system as harsh and unfair. While this is an over-simplification, the problems are real. At the same time, however, virtually everyone believes that user fees are necessary to support the operations of the health system. The problem that people have is with the way user fees have been implemented. This has contributed to negative perceptions about the government health services. Thus, user fee policy is likely to continue to be a politically volatile issue for the Ministry of Health.
Conclusions
The findings of this study suggest that the user fee system, as it operates in the Volta Region, has (a) made an essential contribution to the operating revenues of health facilities, and (b) failed to protect access and income for poorer members of the community. Fees have clearly contributed to financial sustainability, but at the expense of equity considerations, as reflected in largely non-functional exemption mechanisms. Although the current study was not planned as a follow-up to Waddington and Enyimayew's 1990 study (analysing the effects of fees through 1988), it is interesting to note what seems to have changed, and not changed, in the years since that time. Among their key findings and conclusions were:
1)
Fees were generating significant additional revenues.
2)
Managers were having difficulties using fee revenues to improve quality.
3)
Exemptions did not function very well, and largely benefited health workers. There was a risk that managers' attention was becoming increasingly focused on revenue-raising, at the expense of health, and especially the needs of the population who were non-users of the services.
With respect to each of these issues, the findings of our study lead us to conclude that:
1)
Fees are generating even more revenues than in the earlier period.
2)
Management capacity and systems for making effective use of fee revenues have greatly improved.
3)
Revenue-raising through fee collections is dominating other concerns of facility managers and health workers, at the expense of the health and health care needs of the poor.
Some changes in the way the system operates are clearly needed to simplify fee collection practices, promote access and income protection for the poor, and make the system more transparent to the population. In terms of policy, this does not necessarily entail creating a new national fee schedule, but it does suggest that the MOH should state publicly whether fees and exemptions are to be determined nationally or locally and what criteria are to be used for defining exemptions. A revised policy should also state the key principles of the system and establish mechanisms for routine monitoring and periodic evaluation of implementation to assess conformity with these principles. Many of the fee setting and collection practices by health facilities also need to change. At the facility level, there was a desire among the majority of all categories of persons interviewed (patients, in-charges, FGD participants) for a reduction in the number of fee collection points to a single point. The main reasons were that this would reduce uncertainty in the minds of clients, improve transparency and also reduce delays in receiving services. Accurate receipts should also be provided for all payments made. To reduce the effects of uncertainty about prices on care-seeking behaviour, fee levels should be publicized, not only in health facilities but also in communities. Given the burden that the cost of a health facility visit can place on the finances of a household and the evidence of unnecessary excess prescribing practices, a priority for the attention of decision makers at all levels of the health system should be the improvement of prescribing practices in order to improve both the health and the economic situation of the population. This requires working on the supply side, in order to change prescribing behaviour, and working on the demand side, in order to change popular perceptions about what constitutes good health care. Finally, there is a case to be made for increasing public funding of the health facilities, so long as this is done in a targeted way that promotes access and income protection for the poor. This recommendation is made in the light of international experience about the limited value of exemptions in protecting the poor. While exemption mechanisms in Volta could clearly function less badly, there is no reason to think that they could function well, especially if the requirement to grant exemptions is an 'unfunded mandate' placed on facility managers. New approaches are needed to promote active 'purchasing' of services on behalf of poorer persons. The possibility of establishing small-scale risk pooling mechanisms could be explored, with government funds used to subsidize the participation of poor persons.
